What is treated with moonshine. Purification of vodka and moonshine. Vodka and moonshine: chemical composition and effects on the human body

The book builds on the ideas presented by the author in an article published in the Harvard Business Review, which won the prestigious McKinsey Award for Applied Character and Innovative Thinking in Business and Management. John Kotter encourages organizations to create a combined management system that combines a time-tested, reliable and effective hierarchical organizational structure with a flexible and dynamic network structure similar to that of a start-up company (startup). According to the author, the combined management system provides large, mature companies with a key tool in order to meet the requirements of a rapidly changing environment.

The book is intended for anyone who is ready to implement significant reform in their organization with the goal of achieving competitive victories in any industry - whether it be public administration or financial services.

The limit of the hierarchical structure

You find that key initiatives are led again and again by the same people you can rely on.

You find that the interaction between functional units occurs with a clearly unsatisfactory speed and efficiency. The same applies to information flowing in the organization "top down" and "bottom up". Result: loss of speed, braking.

You find that corporate policies and procedures, even those that are perfectly reasonable and expedient, become barriers to the timely implementation of strategic projects. The number of rules and procedures inevitably increases over time, they are implemented as a solution to urgent problems in the field of cost containment, quality assurance and compliance with legal requirements. But in a rapidly changing world, redundant rules and procedures become bumps in the road, if not concrete blocks that stop traffic.

You find that focusing on quarterly results is at odds with the strategic goals a company needs to win in a competitive environment. It is not difficult to imagine which topic will generate the most interest at a meeting discussing a long-term program for the development of innovations and an urgent firefighting at the plant. Multiply this discussion by 100 or 1000 and you'll see why so many ideas about how to increase an organization's innovation capacity have an inglorious end.

Part of the problem is social in nature: people are often reluctant to do anything without permission from above. The other part of it is simply related to human nature: people cling to their habits and are afraid of losing power and status.

The irony is that complacency is often the result of past successes. People do not believe that there is an urgent need to change something, and resist change. And with insufficient involvement in what is happening, without conviction in the goal, they may believe that changes are needed, but do not trust initiatives launched from above. Both complacency and lack of personal involvement slow down progress.

This is often not visible from the office of a high boss. It's always tempting to pin the problems on specific people: middle managers who can't manage, or MBAs who aren't interested in anything other than their careers. In reality, these problems are systemic in nature and are directly related to the restrictions that the hierarchical structure and typical management processes impose on the organization.


Dedicated functional units in the format of departments, or services, or blocks are an integral part of the hierarchical structure. It is possible to separate them with thinner walls, leaders may try to overcome the limitations / narrowness of their interests, but such divisions themselves cannot be canceled. The same goes for rules and procedures: you can reduce their number, but you can't abandon them. The list goes on and on. You can reduce the number of levels in a management hierarchy, but you cannot eliminate levels entirely. You can require employees to focus on strategic goals, but you cannot cancel quarterly budgeting and goal setting.

These factors are an integral part of the system and - as you might expect - ultimately hinder all efforts to accelerate change and implement strategies in a rapidly changing business environment.


Many managers understand all this, sometimes intuitively, and try to cope with problems of this kind with the help of all sorts of improvements. They create special structures for design work. They use workgroups to create opportunities for functional units to work together. They bring in strategic consultants or create strategic planning departments that can focus on long-term issues. In addition, they add strategic planning to annual operational planning. By overcoming complacency, reducing resistance, and increasing the self-interest of ordinary employees, wise leaders create an environment in which change is possible.

However, these improvements only work up to a certain limit. The existing hierarchical structures and management processes that make up the operating environment of any organization are not “bad” or outdated. They just have their limits. What we need today is a powerful new building block to solve the problems created by the increasing complexity and rapid change of the world around us. The solution, which I think works surprisingly well, is to supplement the hierarchical structure with another structure - a network structure that looks more like a solar system than an Egyptian pyramid. A structure that can give an organization the flexibility and ability to change quickly. The task of the new structure is not to overload, but to supplement the hierarchical management system of a mature organization, freeing the latter for the work for which it is intended. This facilitates the work of the enterprise, while accelerating strategic changes. The question is not 'either/or'. I propose a model in which both structures work together. Combined control system.

New direction

Let me clarify my idea. I'm not talking about improved collaborative ("cross-departmental") working groups, strategy committees, innovation boards, a policy of giving people time to work on their own creative projects, either individually or collectively. These techniques, no matter how good they are, do not make the hierarchical management system adequate for the tasks facing modern business. What I propose, although based on familiar structures, practices and thinking, involves a radical change in the status quo.

Most start-up companies (start-ups) have a network structure - because it is important for them to be mobile, fast and creative in order not to miss any of the opportunities that open up. Even in mature organizations, informal networks of change agents often operate outside the hierarchical view, allowing innovation to be implemented more quickly.

What I will describe here also echoes some of the most interesting management ideas of the past few decades: from Michael Porter's call for organizations to pay more frequent and explicit attention to strategy; through Clayton Christensen's discoveries that traditionally organized companies do poorly with the radical technological innovations that accompany our current existence; and to the recent work of Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, which describes the brain as two coordinated systems - one more emotional, the other more rational.

The processes taking place in the new network structure (network organization) are less like regular management, which puts stability and efficiency at the forefront, and more like inspiring leadership, creating flexibility and dynamics. The set and sequence of processes in the network structure follows the logic of the 8-step model of change, which I first outlined 15 years ago in the book Ahead of Change.

The network structure within our combined management system implements rapid changes in the organization according to the "8 steps" model and amplifies their effect many times over. This result can be achieved by involving as many people as possible as active agents of change. This result can be achieved by creating a sense that it is urgent to realize the Great Opportunity. Launched to solve a particular strategic problem, the processes of change no longer stop. They become agents of change, creating and sustaining strategic agility and dynamism in the organization.

The direction I'm going to outline in this book, though not new to some pioneers, solves problems that have plagued us for decades.

For a quarter of a century, people have been talking about the need for more leaders, because in our time of constant change and intensifying competition, two or three top leaders of an organization can no longer cope with all the tasks that require leadership qualities. But few positions in the traditional company hierarchy provide the information and experience needed to become a leader. Courses or textbooks on leadership obviously do not solve the problem, because the development of leadership beliefs and the acquisition of leadership skills occur at work, not in the classroom.

Over the past decade, we have heard the word “innovation” more and more often. And how many organizations do you know where innovations are implemented in the work of the financial department, logistics service, IT department? We criticize managers for lack of initiative or strategic vision, but we forget to look at the system they work in. Complex hierarchies with well-tuned regular management processes are not designed to step creatively into the future. Innovation means risks, requires thinking outside the box, studying problems from the points of view of various functional units. The hierarchical structure is designed to minimize risks, regulate the behavior of employees and fix the boundaries between departments. This gap cannot be eliminated by evolutionary transformations.

For half a century, the authors have been writing about the release of human potential and sincere feelings and the direction of the released energy to solve the most complex strategic problems. But has anyone other than startups been able to implement this? Most people today live in rigid hierarchical models that are optimal for routine operations, models that gently require employees to "keep a low profile," follow commands, and do the same thing over and over again.

People have been complaining for years about strategic consultants who are often powerless to develop and implement a strategy to keep an organization in line with a changing competitive environment. A consultant's recommendations - analytical and soulless, created for 2-5-10 years by a nimble outsider and implemented by a limited number of specially appointed people within the organization - have little chance of success in a constantly changing and increasingly unpredictable world.

And most importantly, for at least 20 years, people have been researching and writing about the ever-increasing speed of business decision-making, the need for companies to act faster and be more agile. Alarm warnings sound louder and louder. In a recent survey of managers and executives, over 90% of respondents indicated that the importance of flexibility and speed has increased in business over the past five years. To the question “How do you plan to look for sources of competitive advantage over the next 15 years?” Most of the respondents answered: "Through a quick reaction to changes in the environment." But who can really respond quickly and dynamically to change other than a few small high-tech firms? The situation will not improve much by refining the usual methods or adding various improvements to a single hierarchical system. It's like trying to improve an elephant so that it is both an elephant and a panther. Good luck daring.

So what do we have ahead of us? In the next chapter, I will outline the contours of a combined management system: its hierarchical-network structure, the basic principles that underlie its effectiveness, the drivers of change, and we will talk about the employees of the organization involved in the operation of a combined management system. In the third chapter, I'm going to tell you the story of one company. This story will show what risks exist in a world of rapid change, how much more and more diverse they are than some people think. In Chapter 4, we look at today's leadership practices and organizational structures and find out how they fall short of the times and why current structures and models won't help us in the face of constant change. In Chapter 5, we will look at how another company implemented a combined management system and what impact this system had on the business. In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, we will try to understand how firms can start building a combined management system.

Dracheva E.L., Libman A.M.

At the end of XX - beginning of XXI centuries. The world economy is entering a qualitatively new stage of its development. The processes of globalization cause the growth of interconnections and interdependence of national economic systems. The formation in the leading countries of a "new economy" based on information technology and computer networks is considered by many authors as a prerequisite for the transition to a fundamentally different paradigm of economic development. In this regard, there are also qualitative changes in the management system of large companies, which are forced to adapt to constantly changing conditions and intensified competition. All this has already led to a new "wave of mergers" of companies, the scale of which is difficult to overestimate. The number of so-called "hostile takeovers" is increasing, when the merger occurs against the will of the management of the target corporation.

However, integrated corporate structures are of particular interest in modern conditions - a special group of corporate associations, characterized by their own patterns of development. Our previous publications have already provided an indicative list of terms used to refer to integrated corporate structures. In this article, the concepts of "metacorporation" and "integrated corporate structure" are mainly used. Metacorporations must be distinguished from corporations proper. The term "corporation", traditionally used in Russia, today is very ambiguous and is used in several meanings. Some authors emphasize the legal aspect of the term "corporation" (it is important to note that the concept of "corporation" is actively used in common law countries, as well as in some others). Other researchers consider mainly the economic side of the concept of "corporation". An approximate classification of the main definitions of this term is given in Table. 1. All this necessitates the introduction of a new term to characterize meta-corporate associations.

Table 1
The main approaches to the definition of the concept of "corporation"

Approach to the definition of "corporation" Sources in which it was used
1. Almost synonymous with the term "joint stock company"1. Avdasheva S.V., Rozanova N.M. The theory of organization of branch markets. - M.: Master, 1998. - P.18;
2. Galperin V.M., Ignatiev S.M., Gorbunov V.I. Microeconomics. In 2 vols. Vol. 1 - M.: Economic school, 1996. - P. 249;
3. Nureev R.M. Microeconomics course. - M.: NORMA - INFRA-M, 1998. - P. 189;
4. Milner B.Z. Organization theory. - M.: INFRA-M, 1999. - P.260 (although in this source the concept of "corporation" is defined broadly in comparison with the definition of a joint-stock company in the Civil Code of the Russian Federation);
5. Khrabrova I.Yu. Corporate Governance: Issues of Integration. - M.: ALPINA, 2000. - P.15 (the author mentions four possible definitions of a corporation, each of which, according to I.Yu. Khrabrova, is more or less justified).
2. The association of individuals and legal entities or capital for the implementation of socially useful activities (that is, as a legal entity - a business partnership or society, a non-profit organization (other than an institution), a production cooperative)6. Kashanina T.V. Corporate law (law of business partnerships and companies). - M.: NORMA - INFRAM, 1999. - S.57, 153;
7. Eskindarov M.A. Development of corporate relations in the modern Russian economy. M.: Respublika, 1999. - S.224;
8. To a certain extent, this definition is used in: Sonkin N.B. Corporations: Theoretical and applied problems. - M.: Moscow Higher Language School, 1999. - P.17, although definition No. 6 is the main one;
9. Feldman A.B. Corporate capital management. - M.: Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation, 1999. - P. 194; while joint-stock companies are recognized as "the main form of corporations";
10. The term corporation has a similar meaning in UK and US law (public, semi-public, business and non-business corporations in the US; sole proprietorships, public, trading (companies) and quasi-corporations in UK law);
11. Swiss law also distinguishes between corporations and institutions.
3. Only a business partnership or company12. Khrabrova I.Yu. Corporate Governance: Issues of Integration. M.: ALPINA, 2000. - S. 15.
4. Commercial organization13. Iontsev M.G. Joint stock companies: Legal bases. property relations. Protecting the rights of shareholders. - M.: Os-89, 1999. - P.10;
14. Khrabrova I.Yu. Corporate Governance: Issues of Integration. - M.: ALPINA, 2000. - S. 15.
5. A special type of joint-stock companies, characterized by a transnational nature of activity, large size, dominant position in the market, etc.15. Strakhova L.P., Bartenev A.E. Corporate formations in the modern economy.//Management in Russia and abroad. - 2000. - No. 6. - P.25 (although for the analysis of such associations, the authors also use the institutional approach, referring to corporations and holdings and other meta-corporate associations).
6. An association of several legal entities (metacorporation) that does not have the status of a legal entity16. Sonkin N.B. Corporations: Theoretical and applied problems. - M.: Moscow Higher Language School, 1999. - P.17;
17. Khrabrova I.Yu. Corporate Governance: Issues of Integration. - M.: ALPINA, 2000. - S. 15;
18. It is necessary to highlight the term "large diversified corporation" (Novitsky E. Strategic planning in highly diversified corporate structures: in world practice and on the experience of AFK Sistema.//Russian Economic Journal. - 1999. - No. 8. - P.75 ) - the source in which this category is used does not contain its unambiguous definition, but from the context it follows that we are talking about associations of several legal entities.
7. The economic system, which includes three links - financial, industrial and commercial and managerial (in this case, the legal aspect of the concept is given less attention)19. Maslechenkov Yu.S., Tronin Yu.N. Financial and industrial corporations of Russia. - M.: DeKa, 1999. - P.3;
20. This definition is also used in: Eskindarov M.A. Development of corporate relations in the modern Russian economy. - M.: Respublika, 1999. - S.224.
8. The type of organization characterized by a certain corporate culture - maximum centralization and authoritarian leadership, opposing oneself to other associations (as opposed to an individualistic organization)21. Lafta J.K. The effectiveness of the organization's management. - M.: Russian business literature, 1999. - P. 167;
22. Related definitions are used in some social sciences, such as sociology.

Various authors also provide a number of alternative definitions of metacorporations. One of the most complete is the concept of three criteria for an integrated corporate structure, put forward by J. Pappe, according to which a metacorporation is an association of several economic agents (legal entities, as well as organizations that are not legal entities) that meets the following requirements: 1) at least part economic agents are commercial organizations operating for profit; 2) there are stable relationships between agents, more rigid than market ones; this means that in some essential aspects the whole association acts as a single whole; 3) there is a strategic decision-making center, which can be both a legal entity and a group of individuals - owners and top managers; this center is called the central element.

Based on the Pappe criteria, one can enter the first, economic and legal definition metacorporations are an association of several legal entities, at least some of which are commercial organizations, in most cases they do not have the status of a legal entity. Thus, in Russian legislation, the only type of business association that has the status of a legal entity, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF), are unions (associations), which, however, are always non-profit organizations. In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Creation of Financial and Industrial Groups in the Russian Federation" dated December 5, 1993 No. 2096, financial and industrial groups (FIGs) - an association of enterprises that meet Pappe's criteria - received the status of a legal entity, but this Decree was adopted even before the entry into force of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, in which an exhaustive list of organizational and legal forms of legal entities was given; Subsequently, the Federal Law "On Financial and Industrial Groups" dated November 30, 1995 No. 190-FZ deprived FIGs of the status of a legal entity. Abroad, various legal forms of metacorporations (concerns in Germany, holding groups in the USA and Great Britain, keiretsu in Japan, chaebols in South Korea, industrial and financial groups in Ukraine, economic groups in Belarus, financial and industrial groups in other CIS republics, etc. ), as a rule, do not have the status of legal entities. And, for example, in the legislation of Ukraine, associations, concerns, corporations and consortiums are considered as legal entities (see:).

It is possible to bring another economic definition metacorporations. According to contract theory, firms are both the market and the firm as alternative transactional systems; Moreover, if the main mechanism of coordination in the market is price, then the system of commands is used in the firm. The firm (hierarchy) and the market (polyarchy) are extreme manifestations in a kind of continuum that also contains many intermediate forms that combine both price and command control mechanisms. It is these intermediate (hybrid) forms that are metacorporations. Of course, the economic and economic-legal definitions of a metacorporation coincide only in general. Thus, there are a number of corporations that have the status of a legal entity, and at the same time use the principle of decentralization, internal entrepreneurship, internal markets and the autonomy of individual units (horizontal corporations, circular corporations, companies with a divisional structure), which are not metacorporations from the point of view of economic legal definition, but are treated as such from the point of view of the economic definition. On the contrary, holdings, which formally consist of a number of legal entities, are often so tightly centralized associations that individual enterprises in their composition have much less independence than divisions of a horizontal corporation. In this case, from the point of view of an economic definition, they are hierarchies, not metacorporations, but from an economic and legal point of view, a holding is one of the most striking examples of a metacorporation.

Metacorporations today operate in a variety of industries and sectors of the economy, at all levels of the economic system - from regional to transnational. At the same time, they are characterized by two major trends: 1) transnationalization, i.e. the desire, through foreign direct investment (FDI), to expand the scope of its activities on a global scale, creating subsidiaries and branches abroad; 2) the integration of industrial and financial institutions within the framework of a metacorporation, i.e. participation of banks and non-bank financial institutions in metacorporations.

In modern economic theory, there are a number of alternative theories of metacorporations. All the theories under consideration are based on the concept of "the need for metacorporations", which is considered, however, in different ways: 1) as the existence of objective economic laws leading to the emergence of banking metacorporations; 2) as the expediency of creating banking meta-corporations, the profitability of such actions for all participants. The second concept of necessity contains an element of subjectivity, but at the same time focuses on the will of each economic subject. On the basis of the second concept of necessity, concrete models of the effectiveness of integrated corporate structures are formed. Today, economic-mathematical, econometric and statistical models are increasingly being used, and simulation models are also being developed using a personal computer. In existing theoretical approaches, the concepts under consideration are often not separated.

Theoretical approaches to the analysis of a metacorporation can also be divided in terms of priority objects of analysis: 1) attention can be directed to the role and place of a corporation in the economic system, abstracting from relations within a metacorporation (at the same time, a metacorporation in economics is treated as a kind of "material point" in physics ); 2) the basis may be the study of the internal aspects of the activities of the metacorporation. To date, a number of theoretical concepts of metacorporations have developed in world and domestic science from the point of view of their internal nature.

1. Many authors proceed from the analysis of metacorporations as specific forms of merging individual companies. From this point of view, the synergetic theory of mergers is considered basic. There are also alternative theories of mergers - the agency theory of free cash flows and the theory of pride - however, they are less confirmed by theoretical studies, although they focus on the most important factor in the functioning of any corporation in general and in particular - any metacorporation, namely: the factor of differentiation of interests of various groups involved in the management of the metacorporation. At the same time, this approach does not explain the reasons for the formation of metacorporations, and not just the merger of companies, reducing them solely to legal restrictions.

2. In this regard, there is also an interpretation of metacorporations as alternative forms of expansion in relation to the merger. It is this that underlies the above economic definition. Thus, one theory explains the formation of metacorporations as a compromise between the interests of insiders and outsiders in the management of companies that find themselves dependent on the central element, seeking to take full advantage of integration, but retain a certain autonomy. This approach is considered most fully in the internalization model and institutional theories. Metacorporation is a system of coordination of economic agents in the process of resource allocation. From this point of view, the metacorporation, in which there are always (to one degree or another) "centers of power and power", and the market, which in its classical embodiment should be a system of perfect competition, are alternative ways of organizing the interaction of economic entities. At the same time, the contract theory of the R. Coase firm and the model of O. Williamson, who, analyzing the limits of the expansion of the hierarchy in relation to the market, reduces them, in fact, to the second law of Gossen (the equality of the marginal costs of the hierarchy and polyarchy) becomes the initial theoretical basis for the analysis. Thus, a metacorporation is, in fact, a specific internal market, isolated from the outside world. An integrated corporate structure is considered not so much as a separate company, but as a system of interaction between business entities. Similar approaches were used in the analysis of metacorporations by V.Mikryukov and S.Avdasheva. Thus, the first author considers it necessary to single out a special theoretical direction devoted to the analysis of the interaction between economic entities and using the methodologies of mathematical modeling. S. Avdasheva actively uses neoclassical and institutional approaches to the analysis of integration in her research; she also pays great attention to hybrid forms of organization, that is, metacorporations. It is no coincidence that, in addition to financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and holdings, it considers groups of producers connected by systems of non-monetary settlements, tolling contracts, non-payments, and barter as the main forms of organization of metacorporations. A similar principle is applied in a number of other works - while metacorporations are considered as forms of business cooperation and joint planning of activities, which include long-term contractual relationships, the provision of financial and commercial services on a long-term basis, leasing and franchising, participation in capital (including .h. holding), financial and industrial groups, business unions and temporary associations of companies. Within the framework of institutional theories, metacorporations can be considered as systems of relations between principals and agents, organized according to the principle of competition of agents, participation of agents in profits, or coalition of agents. This approach is related to the concept of a corporation in common law countries, where there is no structure of the bodies of a legal entity, and the directors of a corporation are considered as its agents. However, a similar approach can also be used in the analysis of corporate associations. The same can be said about many provisions of the theory of economics of organizations (see).

3. One of the interesting approaches is the analysis of the movement and evolution of forms of capital as the economic basis for the functioning of banking metacorporations. In this regard, the concepts of financial capital are being developed (introduced by R. Hilferding and understood by him as banking capital, capital in monetary form, which actually turns into industrial capital (quoted by), as well as the latest theory of financial and industrial capital (see) At the same time, such a concept fully allows one to analyze those metacorporations that include banks and industrial enterprises.This means that the economic and organizational form of the functioning of financial and industrial capital is a financial and industrial group (this concept is considered in more detail when analyzing the classification banking metacorporations), and in the political sphere, financial and industrial capital causes the emergence of financial and industrial elite... It should be noted that within the framework of this theory, four main economic processes are distinguished that determine the formation of metacorporations: 1) concentration of capital, 2) centralization of capital, 3) concentration

4. Finally, the latest approach is the theory of economic power, developed by both foreign (J.K. Galbraith, R. Muller (quoted by) and domestic (A. Movsesyan (for example)) scientists. Its advantage is the combination of the first and second concepts of necessity , taking into account the volitional component in the actions of economic entities... In general, today the problem of economic power is becoming one of the central ones in economic theory... Thus, V. Radaev believes that the theory of economic power can become basic in the development of Russian economic science (see), but in the opinion J.K. Galbraith, economic theory that does not analyze power relations is meaningless and devoid of any influence on real processes... Metacorporations concentrate a variety of resources of economic power, actively applying them.At the same time, within the framework of metacorporations, power relations include four components: 1) organizational the power of management in each of the companies that are part of the metacorporation; 2) the power of the central element over other components of the metacorporation, 3) the power of the metacorporation in the market, i.e. market power, 4) the power of the metacorporation in the economic and social systems as a whole, its influence on political and social phenomena. This creates a specific power space, in which the central element of the metacorporation controls the main aspects of the activities of all economic agents. Following I. Khrabrova’s scheme of the main elements of financial and industrial groups (in principle applicable to other types of metacorporations), the power space of an integrated corporate structure can be represented as three concentric spheres (zones): A - a zone of circular and cross-holdings, in which all companies are closely are interconnected by cross participation in capital and multi-directorate systems combining hierarchical and etarchic property relations: B - zone of hierarchical holdings created under the control of individual "core" companies: C - zone, control over enterprises of which is based mainly on contracts and control over resources. Similar is the French classification, according to which the "core of the group", "group in the broadest sense of the word" and "sphere of influence of the group" are distinguished. The central element of the metacorporation is located in the center of the power space.

5. Today, combined concepts are also used, combining a number of separate approaches. For example, the concept of "capital" is considered primarily in connection with the resources of economic power (in this case, monetary, economic, social, cultural, symbolic capital is singled out, which, in principle, can be converted into each other). The chain "financial-industrial (financial) capital - financial-industrial groups - financial-industrial elite" is analyzed, which is the subject of economic power relations (see ). The concept of "power capital" stands apart, considered as a force that generates power space. R.H. Hall's approach can also be considered combined, which, using the provisions of organization theory, emphasizes the concept of "interorganizational relations", in the analysis of which the theory of economic power is actively used, and the organizations themselves, following the example of Galbraith, are interpreted as "instruments of power" and even as "synonyms for power".

From the point of view of the interaction of metacorporations with the external environment, they perform a number of functions in the course of their activities: firstly, these are the general functions for the production of goods and the provision of services performed by companies within the metacorporation; secondly, these are the specific functions of big business, both explicit (the function of the optimal combination of production factors, the function of creating a social product and facilitating the distribution of national income, the organization function, the innovation function, the function of effectively satisfying demand), and latent functions (foreign economic representation of the national economy , the exercise of real economic power in the country). In terms of their role in the country's economy, metacorporations are complex phenomena, which is reflected in Fig. 1. At the same time, individual components of the role of metacorporations are realized by them only insofar as they include banks, industrial companies, etc. An important role in the study of integrated corporate structures from the point of view of this approach can be played by developments in the theory of industrial organization and sectoral economics (on Russian language published a number of works in this area). Finally, some authors associate the development of metacorporations with the desire of the world economy to "increase the level of planning" (in this case, we are talking about using an objective approach to the concept of "necessity").

Figure 1. The role of metacorporations in the national and global economy

The structure of the theory of metacorporations is presented in Table. 2.

table 2
The main aspects of the theory of metacorporations

The concept of necessity The analyzed aspect of the activity of metacorporations
inner nature The role of metacorporations in the economic system
Objective (necessity as a result of economic development)Concepts of the internal nature of metacorporations1. Concepts of functions of metacorporations;
2. Theory of industrial organization;
3. The theory of metacorporations as carriers of "planning in the world economy".
Subjective (necessity as "profitability" of a metacorporation for its members and/or society)Economic and mathematical models of the effectiveness of corporate integration (market modeling, information cost model, etc.)Theories of state and normative regulation of meta-corporations.

At the same time, when analyzing metacorporations, from the point of view of the dialectical relationship between form and content, it is very important to consider not only their economic essence, but also the form, which is highly differentiated. At the same time, the concept generally accepted in German economics is curious, according to which the form of any enterprise (or association of enterprises) - Unternehmensform - is considered from the point of view of two elements:

In reality, both of these components are closely interrelated - the management structure takes into account existing legislation, and the legislation should clearly control possible management structures, providing, however, sufficient independence in the choice of management systems. Similarly, it is possible to consider the organization of any integrated corporate structure. At the same time, the business structure of metacorporations is basically organized in the same way as that of any other large company (there are line-headquarters, divisional, matrix structures, etc.). It should be noted that the components of the business structure and individual legal entities in the metacorporation should not coincide at all. On the contrary, in a number of cases, several subsidiaries may constitute one business unit, or vice versa.

Despite the increased attention paid to the problems of the functioning of metacorporations by researchers, a unified classification of such associations has not yet been formed. In part, this can be explained by the interweaving of numerous metacorporations among themselves, the gaps between legislation and the economic essence of phenomena. At the same time, revealing the classification of metacorporations is the most important prerequisite for their study. There are two main approaches to the classification of integrated corporate structures. In accordance with the first, the classification is carried out according to a number of criteria identified by the researcher. The second approach is the consideration of complex forms of integrated corporate structures and their comparison according to various indicators. In fact, the first approach defines a multidimensional continuum, in which each coordinate axis corresponds to one or another classification of metacorporations. Within the framework of the second approach, those points (forms of metacorporations) are singled out in this continuum, which are the most typical combinations of various features encountered in practice. At the same time, the classification of already identified complex forms of metacorporations can be carried out using specific criteria. It should be noted that in some cases the classifications of forms of metacorporations are applicable to the grouping of all metacorporations as a whole. Thus, many authors single out regional, interregional, federal and interstate financial and industrial groups (FIGs), but in accordance with the criterion of geographical distribution, a similar classification of any form of metacorporations can be distinguished.

The most frequently mentioned complex forms of metacorporations are cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortiums, concerns, unions, business associations, corners, pools, franchises, holdings, virtual companies, strategic alliances, FIGs, complexes, transnational corporations and transnational banks (TNK and TNB) , industrial hubs, contract groups, divisional companies, business networks. Certain complex forms of metacorporations are inherent in individual states - financial coalitions (USA), shudan and keiretsu (Japan), chaebols (South Korea), etc. Many of these concepts are ambiguous. Thus, the term "holding" is used in several meanings: 1) as a holding company that controls a number of dependent companies, 2) as a holding group that unites the holding company and subsidiaries. Holdings by some authors refer to complex types of metacorporations, others - to a variety of metacorporations in terms of the use of shareholder control in them. In some classifications, a holding (H-form) is generally considered as a kind of business structure, along with a linear headquarters, divisional, etc. , in others - as a legal form of metacorporations. Finally, a broad definition of a holding from the point of view of the theory of economic power (“a group of societies in which one society (the dominant one) has the opportunity to impose its will on others (subordinates)”) makes it possible to attribute almost any centralized metacorporation to this group, for example, franchising. Similarly, there are many different definitions of the terms "transnational corporation", "multinational corporation", "global corporation", "international company, etc." .

Currently, a number of fundamentally new forms of metacorporations are being formed. Some of them are connected with the development of internal entrepreneurship and decentralization of companies (circular corporations, horizontal corporations), others with the development of Internet technologies (virtual production chains, quasi-holdings, project communities). Virtual companies are often included in the latter group, but there are several definitions of the latter in the literature: firstly, associations of companies connected exclusively by contractual relations and work on a specific project are considered as virtual companies, and secondly, we are talking about communities of companies united using the latest information technologies . Several newer types of metacorporations can be mentioned. Thus, the introduction of bank card systems has led to the emergence of groups that include acquiring banks (beneficiaries) and the card issuing bank, which plays the role of a central element. Another form of meta-corporations is emerging on the Internet today - "virtual universal banks", that is, Internet companies that provide a client's connection with specialized banking institutions and provide proper services.

I would like to note one more feature of FIGs as a form of metacorporations: in Russia, as a result of the legislatively established constitutive (legal-forming) procedure for registering FIGs, a gap has formed between formal (registered in accordance with the requirements of the law) FIGs and real (informal) FIGs. Often, several formal FIGs are included in one informal one. All this leads to the duality of the concept of FIG in Russia: FIG in the broad sense of the word (association of banks and industrial enterprises, subdivided into financial-industrial, industrial-financial, etc., depending on the dominance of one or another component) and FIG in the narrow sense words - specific legal forms in which associations of enterprises are created. At the same time, the concept of an industrial-financial group, for example, acquires a completely different meaning - we are talking about legal structures of the Ukrainian legislation similar to Russian FIGs.

The approach to the classification of metacorporations in accordance with certain criteria is given in Table. 3.

Table 3
Classification of metacorporations

Classification criterion Types of metacorporations
1. According to the composition of participants1. Commodity groups
2. Financial groups (include only banking and financial institutions)
3. Financial and industrial groups (associations of banks and industrial enterprises)
4. Incl. financial and agro-industrial groups (associations of banks and agribusiness enterprises)
5. Trade and financial groups (associations of banks and trading companies)
6. Financial and media groups (associations of banks and media companies)
7. Industrial groups (includes only industrial companies)
8. Trading groups (combines exclusively trading companies)
9. The role of one or another component in a metacorporation is determined by the word order in the classification. Thus, banks dominate in financial and industrial groups, and industrial enterprises dominate in industrial and financial groups. In this regard, it becomes possible to consider the evolution of the group "from financial-media to media-financial"
2. By geography of activity10. Local
11. Regional
12. Interregional (within the framework of associations of regions of individual states, emerging, for example, in the EU, they can also turn into transnational ones)
13. National (federal)
14. Interstate (transnational, multinational, international, multicountry).
15. Global.
3. By the nature of the relationship between the participants16. Holding
17. Distributed holdings (led by a complex network of intertwined companies and affiliates)
18. Classic holdings (based on parent-subsidiary relationship)
19. Etarchy (cross) holdings (based on mutual participation in capital)
20. Management (non-holding), based on the centralization of resources
21. Centralization of supply and sales, incl. barter chains and tolling schemes
22. Coordination through loans, financial investment, insurance and leasing services
23. Regulation of access to information resources and the latest technologies
24. Coordinating the distribution of benefits received from the state and lobbying for state support measures
25. Management (non-holding) based on agreements between participants (provision of a full range of management services by the central element of the metacorporation)
26. Management using custodial services (often combined with holdings)
27. Transfer of a number of functions to some executive bodies (simple partnership, management agreement, central companies of FIGs, management companies, management companies, domicile companies, etc.)
28. Joint establishment and use of missing market structures (stock exchanges, investment, trading, leasing companies, etc.)
29. Supply and sales management
4. According to the stability of relationships30. Long-term sustainable relationships
31. Short-term relationships (consortia, associations for the provision of syndicated loans, for the implementation of specific projects)
5. By the type of relationships used32. One-to-Many Relationships
33. Many-to-One Relationships
34. Vertical integration
35. Horizontal integration
36. Radial Integration
37. Ring integration Some authors distinguish such forms as paired interorganizational relationship, interorganizational set and interorganizational network.
6. From the point of view of Bogdanov's tectology38. Skeletal
39. Centralist
40. Aggressive
7. In terms of relationship with the state41. State
42. Based on the transfer of state property to a newly created legal entity
43. Based on the transfer of state property to an already existing legal entity
44. With significant state participation
45. Created for the implementation of a specific state project
46. ​​Created with sanctions and under the guarantees of the state
47. Created with sanctions, but without state guarantees
48. With a small degree of relationship with the state
8. By type of economic interaction49. Material interactions
50. Financial interactions
51. Information interactions
9. By degree of integration52. Direct administrative subordination of economic units based on state ownership
53. Strong integration based on corporate ownership
54. Holding (full, partial)
55. Cross ownership of shares
56. Minor pooling of assets without voting rights
57. Trust management of shares
58. Contractual Integration
59. Partial cooperation in certain functions or activities (sales, R&D, etc.)
60. Integration based on strategic alliances and non-binding joint operating agreements
61. Long-term contractual relationship
10. By the genesis of integration62. From a family business
63. By decision of the state
64. From an industrial enterprise
65. From bank capital
66. From the unity of the territorial market
67. Based on specific assets
11. By the nature of development in time68. Wavy (discrete)
69. Stable
12. By type of connections70. Hierarchical
71. Network
72. Cyclic
13. By the number of think tanks73. Monometacorporations
74. Bimetacorporations
75. Polymetacorporations
14. By way of education76. Artificial
77. Natural
15. By degree of organization78. Lowly organized
79. Highly organized
16. By the number of institutions in the metacorporation80. Local
81. Forked
17. By economic and financial power82. Powerful
83. Weak
18. According to the degree of observability84. Latent
85. Explicit
19. By the nature of state registration (if the latter is necessary for this type of meta-corporations)86. Legal (official)
87. Illegal (unofficial)
20. By the nature of the relationship with the shadow economy88. No relationship
89. Use of instruments of tax evasion, fictitious contracts, etc. (a group of "shadow business executives")
90. Criminal
21. By sectoral composition91. Horizontal
92. Vertical
93. Conglomerate
22. According to the degree of depth and expediency of creation and expected effectiveness94. Unfinished
95. Having only formal studies
96. Having deep studies
23. By target setting97. Growth of production within the existing range
98. Product diversification
99. Growing export opportunities
100. Cost Savings
101. Driving out competitors
102. R&D implementation
103. Fulfillment of the state order
24. Resource provision104. Own resources
105. Funding in the stock market
106. Financing through bank loans
107. State support
25. By leading central element108. Banking metacorporations
109. Metacorporations around industrial enterprises
110. Meta-corporations around trading enterprises
111. Metacorporations under the auspices of state bodies
112. Multiple centers
26. By sector covered113. Mono-industry
114. Diversified
27. According to the degree of consolidation of property from the central company115. Consolidation sufficient for efficient operation
116. Formal consolidation
28. According to the depth of development of management principles117. Actual implementation of corporate governance
118. Combining individual elements of corporate governance (production, sales, marketing, R&D, etc.)
119. In practice, do not implement corporate governance
29. Classes of metacorporations (this classification was proposed by Yu.S. Maslenchikov and Yu.N. Tronin)120. Banking groups
121. Industrial groups
122. Cooperative groups
123. Commodity concerns
124. Associations
30. By type of management in a metacorporation125. Holding
126. Steering committee (council)
127. Board of Directors
128. Management company
31. According to the reporting system used129. With consolidated reporting
130. No consolidation
32. By the level of state bodies with which the meta-corporation is associated131. Federal authorities
132. Authorities of subjects of the federation
133. Local government
33. By market position134. Monopolists
135. Oligopolists
34. By the nature of international activities and the situation in world markets136. Global companies operating in the new economy. They are characterized by specific foreign direct investment (mainly in the field of the latest technologies), an international team, and network building. Operate in the conditions of the "new economy". They develop both from pre-existing TNCs (Ford) and arise from small companies (Microsoft) (especially characteristic of the United States).
137. Highly specialized TNCs in traditional industries, characterized by the rejection of the policy of creating conglomerates and the aggressive nature of mergers and acquisitions in their industry (especially characteristic of Germany).
138. Traditional TNCs in crisis trying to transform, incl. and through mergers with TNCs of other countries (typical for Japan, South Korea).
139. Traditional TNCs formed on the basis of national financial and industrial groups (developing countries - "new international companies", Mexico, partly China (since the latter TNCs are formed on the basis of state-owned enterprises)).
140. Meta-corporations are "international companies (internationale Unternehmen) actively participating in international competition, but not making foreign direct investment.
141. Metacorporations that do not carry out foreign economic activity.

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1 The essence of the synergistic effect is that when several separate banks and enterprises are merged, their total indicators will be greater than the sum of the same indicators for each member of the association. The principle of synergy is most fully expressed in the formula "2*2=5".

2 This approach was also used by some Russian researchers. So, A.B. Feldman distinguishes: 1) economic mechanisms of integration (relations between parent and subsidiary enterprises, relations between the dominant and dependent enterprises, holding, franchising, cooperation, cartel, partly factoring, as well as "Resource Recepture") and 2) organizational- legal forms in which these mechanisms operate (holding, syndicate, consortium, association, concern, FIG).

3 This approach was laid down in the draft federal law "On Holdings", adopted in the summer of 2000 by the State Duma of the Russian Federation, but rejected by the President.

4 Note that similar discrepancies in terminology exist in the economic science of foreign countries, for example, Germany.

5 Pappe Ya.Sh. Oligarchs: Economic Chronicle 1992-2000. - M.: GU HSE, 2000. - P.175

The modern West places great stakes on the value of equality. Equal rights are enshrined in law, and the old hierarchies of the nobility and social classes have been questioned, if not completely destroyed. Few would doubt that a global society is a good thing in terms of these changes. However, hierarchies have not disappeared. Modern society is still divided into layers based on wealth and status.

On the other hand, the idea of ​​a purely elitist world, in which there are no hierarchies at all, seems unrealistic and unattractive. If you think about it, no one wants to get rid of hierarchies, for we all benefit from the recognition that some people are more qualified than others to fulfill certain roles in society. We prefer to be treated by experienced surgeons rather than young students, receive financial advice from specialists rather than trainees. Good and valid hierarchies are everywhere.

However, hierarchy is too old-fashioned to be defended or praised. The British government condemns experts whose views do not coincide with public opinion; the campaign platforms of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders criticized the Washington elite; economists are accused of failing to predict the 2008 crisis; and even medical professionals are viewed with distrust, especially when it comes to childhood vaccinations. We live in a time when no distinction is made between justified and useful hierarchies on the one hand and self-serving and exploitative elites on the other.

As a group, we believe that a clearer view of hierarchy and equality is key to business, politics, and public life. We must lift the taboo on discussing good hierarchies. Given the fact that hierarchies are inevitable, it's important to create good ones and avoid those that are considered bad. It is also necessary to determine how useful and correct hierarchies support and encourage normal forms of equality. Speaking of hierarchies, we mean those features and classifications that carry clear differences in power.

We are a heterogeneous group of scientists and thinkers who have fundamentally different views on most political and ethical issues. We recently took part in an active discussion of these issues under the auspices of the Berggruen Philosophical and Cultural Center in Los Angeles. We all agreed that much could be said in defense of certain hierarchies. The ideas presented in this article deserve wider and closer attention. They take on new urgency as world politics is now moving towards populism, which often criticizes establishment hierarchies, but, paradoxically, grants authoritarian power to individuals who claim to speak in the name of “the people.”

So, what should be said in defense of the hierarchy?

First, bureaucratic hierarchies can be good for democracy. Bureaucracy today is even less popular than hierarchy. However, bureaucratic hierarchies can reinforce important democratic values ​​such as the rule of law and equality.

There are at least three ways in which hierarchical constitutional institutions can promote the development of democracy: 1) protecting the rights of minorities and ensuring that their basic interests are not infringed upon by self-serving or biased majorities; 2) curbing the power of majority or minority factions in order to prevent them from legislating in their own interests, under the guise of the public good; and 3) an increase in epistemological resources that influence decision-making, lawmaking, and policy in general. Thus, democracy must be built on hierarchies, as they contribute to its development.

However, in recent decades these social hierarchies have been destroyed and replaced by decentralized, competitive markets, all in the name of efficiency. This only makes sense if efficiency and effectiveness (usually measured in economic terms) are absolute priorities. However, in this case, we attach less importance to such values ​​as the rule of law, democratic legitimacy or social equality. As a consequence, we may sometimes prefer democratically accountable hierarchies that preserve the above values ​​to optimal efficiency.

Hierarchical constitutional institutions are often criticized for not being accountable to voters, but it is very primitive to think that democratic accountability requires such a direct connection. Ultimate accountability is more consistent with the immediate detachment from direct accountability to voters.

In addition to their civic significance, hierarchies can, surprisingly, be conducive to the development of life in general. Hierarchy becomes oppressive when it comes down to mere domination over others. However, there are such forms of hierarchy that are related to power, but not “above”, but “together with” someone. Taoism characterizes this type of power in the example of riding a horse, when sometimes you need to pull on the reins, and sometimes let go. This is not dominance, but coordination of actions. In Taoism, power is a matter of strength and competence, not dominance and superiority. In this sense, hierarchy is empowering, not depriving.

Take, for example, good relationships between parents and children, teachers and students, or employers and employees. It is much easier and more efficient to build them when a person who is at a higher level of the hierarchy does not use his position to dominate those below him. On the contrary, it gives them the opportunity to develop their own strength.

According to one of the main Confucian ideals, the student should strive to surpass his teacher. Confucian hierarchies are distinguished by mutual assistance and support. The point is not to condemn or emphasize distinctive abilities, but to use them effectively for good purposes.

For this reason, inequality of status and power is acceptable only when it is built into relationships of mutual assistance and support and contributes to the development of those who are at the lower levels of the hierarchy. This is consistent with the well-known Taoist concept, according to which power is not a form of domination, but something that empowers those over whom it is exercised.

Hierarchies should also evolve dynamically over time. Hierarchies are often fatal, not because they distinguish between people, but because they perpetuate these differences and keep them from disappearing even when they are no longer needed or have ceased to serve a good purpose. In short, hierarchies become rigid. So, this can explain why, for example, only people with certain merit become representatives of the House of Lords of Great Britain. However, from a historical perspective, this often results in people not only retaining power when they lose trust, but passing it on to their children afterwards. All legitimate hierarchies must change over time to prevent unfair concentrations of power. The age hierarchies supported by the Confucians are based on this principle: the younger generation grows up to adopt the high status and authority of the elderly.

In order to provide protection from abuse by those in higher positions in society, hierarchies must also be subject-specific. They cause problems when they become generalized: people who have power, authority or respect in any one area, use their position in all others. Thus, the bearers of political power also have disproportionate legal force: they are beyond the reach of the law or bear less legal responsibility than ordinary citizens. Therefore, we need to resist the so-called "hierarchical drift" - the illegitimate expansion of specific power.

This hierarchical drift is observed not only in politics, but also in other complex areas. It is easy to assume that only specialists are able to make the right decisions. However, the complexity of most real-world problems means that mistakes cannot be avoided. To successfully resolve difficult issues, it is very important to have such universal qualities as open-mindedness, open-mindedness and prudence.

In fact, specialized knowledge can get in the way of these competencies. Since there is a trade-off between the breadth and depth of expertise, it turns out that the better the expert, the narrower his area of ​​expertise. Therefore, experts should not be seen as always making the best decisions, but as outside sources that can be consulted by a group of generalists with universal competencies. These generalists first communicate with experts, then highlight important aspects and, based on them, make a unified decision. So, for example, the decision on the early conditional release of a prisoner from prison cannot be made by just one expert; it should be based on the experience of psychologists, social workers, prison guards, and so on. It is a kind of collective, democratic decision-making process.

But are hierarchies compatible with human dignity? It is important to note that there are many different forms of hierarchies; the same goes for equality. The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” However, we must recognize that we are different from each other; each of us has a unique set of good qualities that can elicit a special kind of positive connection from us: philosophers call it "evaluative respect." Evaluative respect is a form of honoring those who show some kind of superiority: for example, for their high moral character or great skill in an argument. Because superiority is essentially comparable, people will inevitably be ranked based on these scores, so some of them will undoubtedly be better than others (in some respects). The concept of equality in this case can be considered inappropriate.

One of the reasons why hierarchy is offensive to today's egalitarian minds is that it implies respect for those who are higher than them. However, if the idea that respect is a good thing sounds shocking, then so be it. Philosophy sometimes upsets and surprises us.

Hierarchy can be taken as a signal of when deference (in the sense of submission, compliance, and consideration) is expected. Good hierarchies, unlike despotic hierarchies, signal the right kind of honorifics.

Of course, showing a respectful attitude can go too far and lead to very bad consequences. For example, the Confucian exhortation regarding "distinction" between husbands and wives is itself conducive to supporting an oppressive hierarchical social system of gender relations. However, the fact that reverence in excess is bad does not mean that it is wrong, even when shown in due measure.

There are many different reasons to believe that proper respect is a good thing. Recognizing that others know or can do more than we do opens up opportunities for learning and growth. It allows us to access what Li-Hsiang philosopher Lisa Rosenli of the University of Hawaii calls "the complex web of human relationships in which the knowledge of the past is passed on from generation to generation." Reverence expresses recognition of one's finite and erroneous nature, communicates the important role of object relations in the development of personality and the achievement of well-being, promotes smooth - and even beautiful and graceful - social functioning.

Reverence requires acknowledging that we are not equal in terms of skills and a certain set of qualities. However, even if we admit that some people are better than others, or that there is a “class division” among human beings, we should not forget how little this implies, especially in the political sphere.

First, human superiority can take many forms. This means that there are a huge number of ways in which a person can demonstrate his superiority, even if he is generally "average". We just don't know what contributions certain people are capable of making, so we need to let go of prejudice against them and not think that they have the potential to excel in just one particular area of ​​life.

Secondly, despite our difference in abilities, we humans are equal in everything that is fundamentally important for assigning value to life. We are all members of the human species and share important common features that need to be protected. The existence of rankings between people does not mean that those who are on the lower rungs are not worthy of respect.

The policy should reflect this. A political system such as democracy, which embodies the idea of ​​political equality, assumes that each of us possesses some form of human perfection.

Knowledge-based hierarchies are now being criticized; age-based hierarchies are considered out of fashion. However, gerontocracy has an underestimated subtle combination of egalitarian and meritocratic advantages. Historical analysis of Qing China, for example, suggests that, thanks to gerontocratic hierarchies, there were many representatives of low-income groups among the political elites - and all because then life expectancy did not depend on income level. Of course, what worked in the past may no longer be relevant in the future. The structure of society around the world has changed so much that if we try to restore this correlation today, we are unlikely to succeed. For example, wealth now significantly affects life expectancy in many countries, so a true gerontocracy will not be able to ensure the representation of low-income populations.

Gerontocracy is often associated with paternalism, a word that has become yet another dirty word. Political paternalism can be defined as forced intervention in autonomy. This form of hierarchy tends to be viewed with great suspicion, and for good reason: many authoritarian governments do not consider the interests of the people, although they claim to act in accordance with them. However, some forms of paternalism are justified because they can actually promote autonomy.

The argument here is that autonomy requires two things: first, knowing what is best, and second, the ability to live according to that knowledge without being distracted or turned off by our own irrationality. However, these conditions are difficult to meet. Until the beginning of modern times, many philosophers believed that people, for the most part, were creatures not rational enough, so they could not fully realize what was better. Moreover, all psychologists agree that we have very limited control over the irrational elements of our nature.

Good paternalistic interventions then take two forms. They disseminate knowledge about what is best in a way that is accessible to imperfectly rational agents. And they can control the irrational impulses of people from an early age, so that later they contribute to the implementation of the prescriptions of the mind. Such interventions are only justified if they ultimately allow us to act more autonomously. According to Aristotle's theory of habituation, in order to live well, one must develop the habit of living well. Therefore, as paradoxical as the following statement may sound, when we are asked to behave in a certain way from childhood, this subsequently allows us to think more rationally in the long term.

Modern psychology supports this view, because it implies the need to provide appropriate conditions for achieving benefits and making the right decisions. Confucians and modern psychologists believe that human behavior is determined by two factors: internal sources (character traits) and external features of the specific situations in which we find ourselves.

In such a case, a paternalistic hierarchy can benefit from individual anatomy. The following statement can cause a lot of heated debate. Be that as it may, hierarchies promote social harmony. Many cultures rightly attach great importance to overall harmony. This includes living together as well as a genuine concern for the quality of life of others. Excessive hierarchy works against this by creating divisions in society. In fact, in a sense, hierarchy always carries with it the threat of tension, since it is a situation in which one adult person commands another or forces him to do something, while the latter has not done anything wrong, he knows how to make good decisions and not is under the influence of alcohol, temporary insanity, and the like. However, the goal of preserving communal life implies that hierarchy can be justified if—and only if—it either prevents serious dissension or promotes stronger unity.

We can find echoes of such endorsements of hierarchies to achieve harmony in many traditional African societies, as well as Eastern cultures influenced by Confucianism. If we move from theory to practice, we can see that in most Western cultures there are also principles that justify hierarchies. Think of the police, who are given power over others in the name of maintaining public order.

Some ideas associated with hierarchy will no doubt be more favorably received than others. There will also be controversy over whether we need to have a clearer idea of ​​the value of certain hierarchies. We have a preconceived notion about hierarchies, so we are understandably wary of getting too carried away with them. However, we believe that advancing these ideas is essential to start a much needed conversation about the role of hierarchies in a world that is largely egalitarian in that all people are free and equal in dignity and rights. However, be that as it may, hierarchies cannot provide everyone with equal power and authority. But if we want to iron out this necessary disparity, it's time to start thinking seriously about the benefits of hierarchies.

Preview: A man herding a horse, Han Gan (706-783), court painter of Xuanzong.

Chapter 7 Hierarchies

BASIC CONCEPTS

Hierarchy Central agent Vertical integration Principal-agent problem

WHY AND HOW HIERARCHIES APPEAR

This chapter focuses on hierarchical structures. The easiest way is to correlate hierarchies with firms and consider a certain system of relations opposite to the market one. Such an approach is used, for example, in Ronald Coase's classic article "The Nature of the Firm", in which he contrasts centralized intra-firm planning with a market mechanism of exchange regulated by the price system.

However, the firm is only a special case of hierarchy. The state is also a hierarchical structure. Non-profit organizations can also be hierarchical.

Hierarchy is a structure of subordination of individuals whose interaction occurs through commands.

AT hierarchical relations are based on constitutional rules. It is in the constitution of the state that the political structure of the country is determined, as well as the possibility of occupying key posts. Other normative legal acts expand and clarify these provisions. The hierarchy can also be based on informal rules, various traditions and customs. Formal rules usually establish the primacy of the head of the organization, however, the person who makes decisions and gives commands may be the deputy director or his wife or the supply manager Ivan Ivanovich. On the basis of only formal rules, it is also not always possible to get an idea of ​​the completeness of the rights corresponding to the place in the hierarchy. For example, the charter of the organization usually does not mention the distribution of parking spaces, but if you park your car near the entrance, you will receive a remark from a security guard or colleagues and will be forced to make room for management cars. Thus, the maintenance of the rules that define the hierarchy is carried out not only by the higher members of this hierarchy, but also by the lower ones. her members and specialized agents.



Why can managers, subordinates, contractors and society as a whole be interested in the existence of hierarchical structures? Let's step aside for a moment from the advantages of having a hierarchical state structure and consider why individuals join firms.

As shown in previous chapters, the choice of the form of economic organization is determined by the desire to minimize the totality of production and transaction costs.

Savings in transaction costs arise due to the fact that the role of the central agent is allocated in the formation of the hierarchy.

The role of the central agent involves the integration of five key competencies 1:

Rights to residual income (income remaining after payment of all hired resources; in fact, the right to receive all the benefits and bear all the costs of the decisions made);

The rights to determine the direction of the use of resources and control the work of members of the hierarchy;

The right to conclude agreements with all other resource owners;

Rights to change membership;

The right to transfer all powers at once and each separately. In relatively small hierarchical structures, this function is performed by the leader (often he is also the owner). As the hierarchy grows, some powers may be transferred to lower levels, but in the event of a conflict, the final decision is made by the central agent. If the leader in the hierarchy is the central agent, he concludes contracts, usually long-term, with the owners of resources and with consumers of products. The fifth authority can be fully exercised only by the head of the hierarchy.

In the third paragraph of this chapter, we will examine in detail how the distribution of allocated powers affects the emergence of comparative advantages in different types of organizations. Now we note the following: the transfer of the right to control to the upper level of the hierarchy, and its possible dispersal then to lower levels, allows you to benefit from the specialization of an individual with the appropriate abilities for the functions of a manager: not all owners are good entrepreneurs at the same time.

The performance of the coordinating function by the central agent implies that he has the ability to give orders about the use of factors involved in the production process. This makes it easier to adapt to unforeseen events. Adjustment to fluctuations in demand, changes in prices for components, weather conditions is now carried out not with the help of the price mechanism, but with the help of direct instructions on the redistribution of available resources. The transfer to the central agent of the right to conclude contracts with resource owners and external contractors leads to savings in transaction costs of negotiations and conclusion of contracts. To implement the management function, it is important to be able to create incentives for resource owners to work conscientiously. This becomes possible if the central agent decides on hiring and firing, as well as rewards and penalties based on performance. Thus, the threats of punishment of the lower levels of the hierarchy become credible.

The suppression of the manager's opportunism in relations with suppliers and consumers is due to the empowerment of him with the right to residual income. The central agent bears the cost of losing customers due to reputational erosion. That is why he is engaged in setting up incentives for all members of the structure, achieving quality work. Having achieved the effective work of all links of the hierarchy, the manager also has the right to count on additional income.

Consider a simple example: the construction of a country house. One person obviously will not cope with this task: if you are not distinguished by remarkable strength and are not a jack of all trades, you will have to hire a team of workers. In addition to human resources, the involvement of technology may be required. Finally, a house cannot be built without purchasing building materials. Now let's assume that you attract and pay for all options separately. Many are familiar with the situation when cement or sand or nails suddenly run out and it is urgent to provide these builders. At the same time, the workers themselves make the initial calculation of the required quantity, and you have to be responsible for their mistakes. A situation would look strange and extremely inconvenient when, in order to dig holes for the foundation, it would be necessary, through lengthy negotiations and agreeing on a schedule, to connect an excavator and an excavator driver. Finally, the need to pay for the work of each member of the brigade in accordance with his contribution poses a dead end. The matter can reach the point of calculating who carried the light and who carried the heavy edge of the log.

An alternative option involves contacting a company whose head will instruct the designer to develop a project for the house, assign a team to the foreman, provide the purchasing department with all the materials, and also agree with the owner of the excavator on the time of arrival at the site. He will come himself or ensure that a unit of equipment is equipped with a labor unit that knows how to handle equipment. Even if you receive a detailed estimate, the chief will conduct settlements with the owner of each attracted resource himself. If the house is lopsided after a year, you will not have to find out and prove who exactly did the job poorly, claims will be made against the company as a whole.

By entering into a single contract with the manufacturer of the final product, the buyer saves on all types of transaction costs. It is easier for an individual to evaluate the value of the good as a whole than the role of each factor in satisfying the need, to conclude one contract and resolve disputes with one counterparty. True, in such a case it is usually necessary to bear the costs of paying for the work of such a central agent.

Note also that with the long-term existence of a stable hierarchy, there are additional benefits of developing permanent rules of interaction - what is often called a corporate or organizational culture. It also allows you to align the expectations of team members, save on the costs of collective action (these costs will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9).

7.2. GROWTH OF THE HIERARCHY

So, we have determined what a hierarchy is, substantiated the rationality of its existence and the factors influencing its emergence and effective functioning. But where are the boundaries of the growth of the hierarchy? What motivates pre-existing hierarchies to expand and merge? one

Consider the merging of two hierarchical structures that previously carried out activities at adjacent stages of production. Putting aside the difficulty of combining the two structures and setting incentives for a large number of participants, we are again faced with a choice of two institutional alternatives. Preference should be given to the one in which the balance of benefits and costs is positive.

Ronald Coase proposed a general principle for evaluating the expansion of a hierarchical structure (in his firm terminology): “The firm will expand until the cost of organizing one additional transaction within the firm is equal to the cost of doing the same transaction through an exchange on the open market, or with the cost of organizing it by another firm” 1 . Among the main costs of market exchange, Coase noted the allocation of resources to clarify prices, negotiate and conclude contracts.

The analysis of vertical integration within the framework of the new institutional economic theory was further developed in the works of Oliver Williamson 2 . He focuses on the extortion problems associated with investing in specific assets. Such investments can significantly reduce production costs, but in the absence of guarantees, the parties will choose general-purpose assets. The solution to the problem of underinvestment in specific assets can be integration and the transition to a one-way mechanism for managing transactions. In this case, it is important that the counterparty that has invested in specific assets becomes the owner of the final rights, i.e. the right to make decisions in case of occurrence of events not reflected in the contract.

As a first approximation, the dependence of the choice of an institutional alternative on the level of asset specificity is illustrated by Williamson using the following graph (Fig. 7.1).

Rice. 7.1. Ways to manage transactions and the level of specificity of assets

ΔG is the difference between the costs of market and intra-company transaction management; ΔС - the difference between the costs incurred in the production of goods within the company, and the costs associated with the purchase of goods on the market; k - asset specificity; to*- the level of asset specificity at which the hierarchy becomes more efficient in terms of minimizing costs.

The main conclusion of the Williamson model is that the higher the degree of specificity of assets, the greater the benefits of intra-company (hierarchical) management compared to market management. With low asset specificity, which makes it easy to change partners, it is advisable to take advantage of the incentive effect of market mechanisms. It is market competition that creates powerful incentives for making effective decisions; no additional monitoring and incentive systems are required. With an increase in the degree of specificity of assets, the interdependence of counterparties increases. The costs of avoiding opportunism in the form of shirking are lower than the costs that the parties would incur if the relationship ended. These considerations are the basis for representing the function Δ G decreasing. At the same time, the implementation of the production of goods for own needs does not allow realizing economies of scale and diversity, and also implies the rejection of the benefits of specialization and division of labor. From this point of view, market purchases will always be more profitable. However, the more specific the equipment used and the goods produced, the narrower the pool of potential buyers, and the lower the benefits of demand aggregation. That is why the function Δ FROM also decreases with increasing asset specificity. At the asset specificity level to* counterparties do not care whether the transaction is carried out under a market or intracompany control mechanism.

1. Coordinating function of institutions. The mechanism of coordination as a means of regulating the processes of concluding and executing contracts.

2. Main coordination mechanisms: market, hierarchy, networks.

3. Additional coordination mechanisms: hybrid method, direct coordination, bazaar.

4. The essence of the market. Different approaches to market definition (Cournot, Jevons, Mises, Hodgson, Furubotn).

5. The essence of the properties of symmetry and selectivity of market exchange. non-market exchange.

6. The market as a means of reducing transaction costs.

7. Markets as a set of institutions structuring market exchange. Their types (open public market, craft shops, peddling, fairs, stock exchange, department stores, e-commerce).

8. Institutional analysis of the open public market and craft shop.

9. Institutional analysis of peddling, fairs and exchanges.

10. Institutional analysis of department stores and e-commerce.

Main literature:

1. Institutional economics. New institutional economic theory. M.: INFRA-M, 2011. Ch. 6.

2. Furubotn E.G., Richter R. Institutions and economic theory: Achievements of a new institutional economic theory. SPb.: Publishing House. House St. Petersburg. State. Univ., 2005. Ch. 7.

Additional literature:

1. Hodgson J. Economic theory and institutions. M.: Delo, 2003.

Topic 12. Hierarchies

1. The essence and types (firms, state, non-profit organizations) of hierarchies.

2. The system of rules underlying the hierarchy:

formal rules (constitutional, normative acts):

informal rules.

3. The reason for the emergence of firms is the minimization of production and transaction costs.

4. The central agent of the hierarchy as a source of transaction cost savings and its key powers.

5. Distribution of powers of the central agent in firms and organizations. Ownership and management.

6. Teams as a mechanism for the implementation of coordination in a hierarchy.

7. Formation and role of corporate culture in the process of functioning of the hierarchy.

8. Reasons for expanding the hierarchy. Features of vertical integration. The role of specific assets (O. Williamson model).

9. Hierarchy expansion limits:

Distortion and delay of information received and transmitted by the central agent;

Growth of expenses for suppression of opportunistic behavior of agents.

10. Reasons for opportunistic behavior:

Contradictions between the economic interests of the principal and the agent;

The presence of information asymmetry.

11. Ways to combat opportunism in the form of shirk: 1) monitoring; 2) creation of a system of incentives.

12. Collective activity and the free rider problem. Methods for solving it (monitoring the contribution of each employee by the administrator, mutual monitoring, ranked payment system).

13. Types of firms, their institutional features, advantages and disadvantages:

Private enterprise;

partnership;

A company managed by a labor collective (production cooperative);

Non-profit organization (non-profit firm);

State firm;

Regulated firm;

Open corporation;

14. The essence of the state as a hierarchy.

15. Levels of agency relations in the state system.

16. Reasons for the asymmetric distribution of information in the state system.

17. Goals and motives of the behavior of the bureaucracy.

18. Methods for improving the efficiency of the bureaucracy.

Main literature:

1. Institutional economics. New institutional economic theory. M.: INFRA-M, 2011. Ch. 7.

2. Williamson O.I. Economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets, "relational" contracting. SPb.: Lenizdat, 1996.

Additional literature:

1. Shastitko A.E. New institutional economic theory. - 4th edition, revised. and additional - M.: Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University, TEIS, 2009. Ch. 14, 16.

2. Kapelyushnikov R.I. Economic theory of property rights. M.: IMEMO, 1990.

3. North D. Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy. M.: Foundation of the economic book "Beginnings", 1997. Foreword, ch. 2-7.

4. Eggertsson T. Economic behavior and institutions. M.: Delo, 2001.

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